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ABSTRACT
Without contributing, defectors take more benefit from social resources than cooperators which is
the reflection of a specific character of individuals. However, the natural physical mechanisms of our
society promote cooperation. Thus, in the long run, the evolution about genetic variation is some-
thing more than the social evolution about fitness. The loci of evolutionary paths of the cooperation
and the defection are correlated, but not full complement of each other. Yet, the only single spe-
cific mechanism which is operated by some rules explains the enhancement of cooperation where
the independent analysis of defect evolutionary mechanism is ignored. Moreover, the execution
of a particular evolutionary rule through algorithm method over the long time experiences highly
sensitive influence of the model parameters. Theoretically, biodiversity of two types relatively per-
sists rarely. Here I describe the evolutionary outcome in the demographic fluctuation. Using both
analytical procedure and algorithm method the article concludes that the intratype fitness of indi-
vidual species is the key factor for not only surviving, but thriving. In consideration of the random
drift, the experimental outcomes show that dominant enhancement of cooperation over defection is
qualitatively independent of environmental scenario. Collectively, the set of the rules becomes an
evolutionary principle to cooperation enhancement.
Keywords evolutionary game theory · analytical procedure · algorithm method · cooperation enhancement · defection
hindrance
1 Introduction
The demographic fluctuation is not the consequence of a particular account of evolutionary structure[1, 2, 3]. It is
partly an effect of the random fluctuation in the result of the combination of various genetic, ecological and sociological
factors such as selection, reproduction, mutation, migration, etc. The factors collectively play a role in the struggle
for existence [4]. Thus, a random drift on the evolutionary structure would be needed to explain the stochastic effect
of demographic fluctuation. As the clarification of this effect can be based on some logical structure, it obviously has
deterministic interpretation. Here, we explore the random fluctuation features by adopting the concept of individuals’
attachment and leaving tendency to a social network. It has generally found that any kind of regularity break in the
social structure pattern in the sense of either geometry or individual reputation and punishment help to cooperation
enhancement. However, it is not true in all circumstances at all [5, 6].
We already know that the stochastic effects become less important for large population size [7]. In the continuation,
it is also true that the existence of non Darwinian dynamics can only expect under the random scenarios. Thus, how
the local evolution of each of the hub populations affecting on global evolutionary dynamics is one of the important
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subjects of evolutionary research work, where the term hub best suits for small, simple neighbourhood area network
environment of a focal node.
We consider a social network by a simple graph structure of N vertices. Every vertex is occupied by a cooperator
individual (C), occupied by a defector individual (D) or vacant – the place which could be occupied by any one
of the two types (or species) of individuals. Two individuals can interact only if they are connected by an edge of
the graph. We confine ourselves in on the random regular graphs, however, implementing the model concept for the
heterogeneous complex networks is straightforward. The evolution is interpreted here by the genetic reproduction, and
the model formalism is well fitted for the both asexual and sexual contexts. Besides the birth-death update event, the
synchronous formulation accounts the random drift effect while the internal migration is overlooked.
In the social pool, the evolutionary process advances through the function of the fitness values of the individuals, where
the fitness measures by the combination of the fertility effect and the viability effect on gene C and gene D [8, 9].
The effective fitness generally is studied at the reproduction level of an individual [10]. The fitness means the effective
fitness here. We consider the standard payoff matrix of a two-player version of the interaction for the representing the
fitness values, pi∗∗, of the row individual. According to the base matrix of such interaction, cooperators pay a cost to
provide a benefit while defectors neither pay cost nor contribute benefit.
Under the evolutionary game theory framework the birth-death evolution can robustly define the evolutionary dynamics
of pure Darwinian selection [11, 12, 13]. To explain the emergence of cooperation it is mainly emphasised on the
configurational arrangement of individuals in their residential areas where the total population size is always fixed
over time. Assuming so, the derived rules of the analytically tractable model, based on the formalisms like Hamilton’s
rule [14, 15, 16] as well as the static game property like Evolutionarily Stable Strategy [17], are able to figure out
the ubiquitous character of cooperation. However, every rule has its own limitation, and they fail over long ranges of
biological parameters [18]. Thereby, instead of emergence principle the emergence theory has been compelled to rely
on some specific rules of limiting evolutionary cases, up until now.
Based on the experimental outcome obtained by using both analytical procedure and algorithm method where the
procedure and the method are derived through a trick of the putting mathematical tractability before empirical evidence
in this article we infer that the intratype fitness of individual species is the key factor for cooperation enhancement
and defection hindrance. A set of five self-explanatory observables clarifies the whole experimental outcome. In
following the slightly non-conventional way our aim is to demonstrate that in the distinct mechanisms of cooperation
and defection, natural cooperation is a principle of evolution.
2 The model
The outcome of the evolution is the result of the combined effects of the two completely independent events: one
is the birth-death event, and the other is the random drift event [19]. In the underlying mechanism of birth-death,
the expectation value of transition individuals over each of the population hubs has been calculated with respect of
an evolution probability, where the product of the segregation probability and the reproduction-demise probability
determines the probability mass function, i.e. the evolution probability. And, finally the expectation of all calculated
expectation values of transition individuals over all possible hub sizes measures the evolution rate change per unit
time span due to the birth-death event. The other independent event, the random drift, completely is captured within
the probability space, Ω, that being defined by two parameter variables: p is the probability of attachment of a new
individual to the network and q is the probability of leaving of an individual from the network (Fig. 1). The fractional
concentration variables, x and y corresponding to cooperators and defectors respectively, represent the explicit form
of the evolutionary dynamics as:
∂x
∂t
= a3(
x
x+ y
)3 + a2(
x
x+ y
)2 + a1(
x
x+ y
) + σx∇2x,
∂y
∂t
= b3(
y
x+ y
)3 + b2(
y
x+ y
)2 + b1(
y
x+ y
) + σy∇2y,
where a∗s and b∗s are the mathematical functions of fitness, graph degree, and σ∗s are the coefficients of the random
drift. The term concentration means the spatial density here.
The algorithm version of the same dynamical system is examined not only for optimizing our pursuance but also
for determining the initial direction of evolutionary dynamics because the direction determination in the randomness
pattern by utilising the Monte Carlo simulation procedure [20] is essential for the analytical version. The components
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Figure 1: An accumulation of individuals through the random drift in a small area, (2∆h)2, on the probability space
Ω. The Ω is embedded into the geometrical space of the considering network. The arbitrary coordinate (p, q) assigns
the centre position, having the concentration c(p, q, t). The signs, positive and negative point out the relative possi-
bility of the attachment and the leaving of the individuals, respectively. The net effect of a random drift on average
concentration of an individual type is a simple sum of the two resultant flux terms of each of the directions where the
direction of arrows indicates the directions of the impact of the random drift. This is the schematic presentation of the
physical interpretation of the term,∇2c = ( ∂2∂p2 − ∂
2
∂q2 )c. The randomness of the term intuitively understands through
the sign convention. The probability to occur each sign at a particular point may assume to be equal to 0.5 and the
factor 0.5 is part of the σ∗.
of the Moran process determine the reproduction-demise probabilities; and this determination sets the birth-death rules
in the algorithm version. The birth takes place if
random() <
fitness of an individual
maximum fitness of each individual
,
where the death of an individual occurs if
random() <
number of same type neighbour individuals
total number of neighbour individuals
.
The independent rules are valid until the presence of at least one same type individual of the focal individual. The
standard library function, random(), generates a random number at each of the iterative steps. Instead of the segrega-
tion probability – defined by the binomial distribution configuration – the algorithm method uses the manual approach
to measure the segregation tendency. Both the probabilities act at the individual level, not at the gene level. In the
other event, the random drift rule of an attachment individual set to: random()<p·σ∗, while the random drift rule of
a leaving individual set to: random()<q·σ∗, where determination of the preferential selection type individual for the
leaving or the attaching is needed which is described by the majority selection rule.
3
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2.1 The analytical version of the evolutionary dynamics
The overall system is captured on the belief of the evolution of individual character not depending on the specific
architecture of the network/spatial structure; instead, it is dependent on the average number of neighbours of the focal
individual. The system environment comprises of cooperators and defectors, having the normal carrying capacity N .
Now, we take P (i, j, t) is the probability that there are i cooperator individuals and j defector individuals at the time
t, and denote the increasing and decreasing transition rates of the population from one state to its neighbouring state
as T+∗ and T
−
∗ respectively, with appropriate subscripts – the explanation is that in per unit time, through the rate T
+
i−1
the state i − 1 switches to the next neighbouring state i while through the rate T−i the state i switches to the next
neighbouring state i− 1. In the time duration ∆t, replacing the simple rate laws by probability laws we have
P (i, j, t+ ∆t)− P (i, j, t) = T+i−1P (i− 1, j, t) + T+j−1P (i, j − 1, t) + T−i+1P (i+ 1, j, t)
+ T
−
j+1P (i, j + 1, t)− (T+i + T+j + T−i + T−j )P (i, j, t). (1)
The system dynamics is generally described by the above master equation [21]. In the present frontier, we shall show
that based on this probability law, we shall be able to derive the two separate time dependent loci of evolutionary
dynamics, one for cooperator group and the other for defector group following the special mathematical tractability,
so that the system dynamics can be portrayed explicitly.
Keeping in mind the driving fact of random drift like diffusion [22] directed towards the lower concentration state, in
order to convert from the discrete to the continuous state doing slight modification of some appropriate terms in the
master equation, the locus of the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the presence of the i-number of cooperator
individuals, on the continuous state, can be extracted as
iP (i, j, t+ ∆t)− iP (i, j, t) = {0 · T+i−1P (i− 1, j, t) + 0 · T+j−1P (i, j − 1, t)
+ iT
−
i+1P (i+ 1, j, t) + 0 · T−j+1P (i, j + 1, t)
− [−iT+i + 0 · T+j + 2iT−i + 0 · T−j ]P (i, j, t)}∆t
=⇒
N∑
i=0
N−i∑
j=0
[iP (i, j, t+ ∆t)− iP (i, j, t)] =
N∑
i=0
N−i∑
j=0
{iT+i P (i, j, t)− iT−i P (i, j, t)
+ iT
−
i+1P (i+ 1, j, t)− iT−i P (i, j, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
random drift effect
}∆t. (2)
Similarly, using the same master equation the locus of the evolutionary dynamics of defection in the presence of the
j-number of defector individuals, on the continuous state, can be extracted as
jP (i, j, t+ ∆t)− jP (i, j, t) = {0 · T+i−1P (i− 1, j, t) + 0 · T+j−1P (i, j − 1, t)
+ 0 · T−i+1P (i+ 1, j, t) + jT−j+1P (i, j + 1, t)
− [0 · T+i − jT+j + 0 · T−i + 2jT−j ]P (i, j, t)}∆t
=⇒
N∑
j=0
N−j∑
i=0
[jP (i, j, t+ ∆t)− jP (i, j, t)] =
N∑
j=0
N−j∑
i=0
{jT+j P (i, j, t)− jT−j P (i, j, t)
+ jT
−
j+1P (i, j + 1, t)− jT−j P (i, j, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
random drift effect
}∆t. (3)
Next, we have to calculate each term of each equation with following the specific mathematical tractability in view of
the simple natural rules.
• The segregation probability is expanded in a Taylor series at t upto the second order in ∆t and the fact x′ =∑N
i=0
∑N−i
j=0 iP (i, j, t) =
∑N
i=0 iPi(i, t) yields that
4
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N∑
i=0
N−i∑
j=0
[iP (i, j, t+ ∆t)− iP (i, j, t)] =
N∑
i=0
[
∂
∂t
iPi(i, t)]∆t+O(∆t)2
=
∂x′
∂t
∆t+O(∆t)2. (4)
Similarly, the segregation probability is expanded in a Taylor series at t upto the second order in ∆t and the fact
y′ =
∑N
j=0
∑N−j
i=0 jP (i, j, t) =
∑N
j=0 jPj(j, t) yields that
N∑
j=0
N−j∑
i=0
[jP (i, j, t+ ∆t)− jP (i, j, t)] =
N∑
j=0
[
∂
∂t
jPj(j, t)]∆t+O(∆t)2
=
∂y′
∂t
∆t+O(∆t)2. (5)
• In this step, to measure the equality, we have to define the segregation probability which is represented by P , and
the reproduction-demise probability which is represented by T . As according to the order of genetic reproduction
action, the segregation of genes takes place before the natural selection, thus here the segregation probability plays
a role of fertility selection which is nothing but the effect of social arrangement of two types of individuals while
the natural selection role is played by the reproduction-demise probability. However, in the main master equation
the order of the action of two probability terms might be different, first we could count the reproduction-demise
probability then the next would be to count the segregation probability, or vice-versa. This is obvious because in the
component wise representation of master equations a specific number of individuals is assumed at particular times
of t where we confine ourselves in the three consecutive cooperator levels: (i − 1)th level, ith level and (i + 1)th
level as well as in the similar levels for defectors. In the present treatise we follow the natural order, first the fertility
selection and then after the natural selection at the same social structure, and due to following this order, we are able
not only to carry out the local hub calculation but can also extend the calculation to the whole network structure. One
can agree based on such pattern of binomial distribution of two different characters of individuals that, the spatial
or configurational arrangement or fertility effect is to be perfectly defined by Wright-Fisher transition probability in
terms of the expected numbers of cooperators and defectors at particular times t because the Wright-Fisher transition
probability is some extend a more general version of the reproduction rule than the majority selection updating rule,
while the reproduction-demise probability is proper fit to the selection component of Moran transition probability.
To extend the local hub calculation, we consider the system environment is a connected graph with N vertices and
degree distribution p(k). Therefore, with a note that z =
∑
kp(k) and defining the normalised fitness constant Γmax
in the averagely sense of optimum fitness of an individual, such that Γmax ≥ average{piCC , piCD, piDC , piDD}, in
the limit of ∆t→ 0 we have 2
lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
N∑
i=0
N−i∑
j=0
[iT
+
i P (i, j, t)]∆t =
N∑
i=0
iT
+
i Pi(i, t)
=
N−1∑
k=1
p(k)
k∑
i=0
iT
+
i Pi(i, t)
=
N−1∑
k=1
p(k)
k∑
i=0
i
k!
i!(k − i)! (
x′
x′ + y′
)
i
(
y′
x′ + y′
)
(k−i)
× i
zΓmax
(
x′
x′ + y′
piCC +
y′
x′ + y′
piCD)
= { 1
Γmax
(
x′
x′ + y′
) + (
σ2 + z2 − z
zΓmax
)(
x′
x′ + y′
)
2}
× [piCD + (piCC − piCD)(
x′
x′ + y′
)]. (6)
Similarly, in the limit of ∆t→ 0, we have
2Note: Expectation of square of a random variable is equal to variance plus square of the expectation of the random variable.
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lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
N∑
j=0
N−j∑
i=0
[jT
+
j P (i, j, t)]∆t =
N∑
j=0
jT
+
j Pj(j, t)
= { 1
Γmax
(
y′
x′ + y′
) + (
σ2 + z2 − z
zΓmax
)(
y′
x′ + y′
)
2}
× [piDC + (piDD − piDC)(
y′
x′ + y′
)]. (7)
• In this mathematical part, the reproduction-demise probability is proper fit by the demise component of Moran
transition probability where the local hub calculation is extended by the following manner:
lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
N∑
i=0
N−i∑
j=0
[iT
−
i P (i, j, t)]∆t =
N∑
i=0
iT
−
i Pi(i, t)
=
N−1∑
k=1
p(k)
k∑
i=0
iT
−
i Pi(i, t)
=
N−1∑
k=1
p(k)
k∑
i=0
i
k!
i!(k − i)! (
x′
x′ + y′
)
i
× ( y
′
x′ + y′
)
k−i i
z
= (
x′
x′ + y′
) + (
σ2 + z2 − z
z
)(
x′
x′ + y′
)
2
. (8)
Similarly, for the defector component the evaluated expression is given by
lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
N∑
j=0
N−j∑
i=0
[jT
−
j P (i, j, t)]∆t =
N∑
j=0
jT
−
j Pj(j, t)
= (
y′
x′ + y′
) + (
σ2 + z2 − z
z
)(
y′
x′ + y′
)
2
. (9)
• Next, we are interested to measure the possibility whether the particular individual population could be influenced
by out side individuals or not, where this mathematical part deals with the analytical deriving procedure to capture
the effect of the random drift phenomenon to the evolutionary dynamics. Here, we measure the random drift effect
on the probability space Ω which is defined as Ω = {(p = zp′, q) : 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1} where p′ is the
probability of attachment of a new individual at the per degree of a vertex and q is the probability of leaving of an
individual at the maximum degree of a vertex; clearly in the sense of probability in the one dimensional space we
get: q ≤ ¬q ≡ p. However, one dimension is not our concern presently. Now, introducing a dummy small space
length 2∆h and the fractional concentration variable x = ( 1N ) lim∆h→0
x′
(2∆h)2 , equating the conservation law and
the concept of continuous probability law, intuitively it can be written as
lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
N∑
i=0
N−i∑
j=0
[iT
−
i+1P (i+ 1, j, t)− iT−i P (i, j, t)]∆t ∝ 2∆h ·
∂
∂p
x(p+ ∆h, q, t)
−2∆h · ∂
∂p
x(p−∆h, q, t)− 2∆h · ∂
∂q
x(p, q + ∆h, t)
+2∆h · ∂
∂q
x(p, q −∆h, t) = (2∆h)2(∂
2x
∂p2
− ∂
2x
∂q2
)
= (2∆h)
2∇2x. (10)
Similarly, with the fractional concentration variable y = ( 1N ) lim∆h→0
y′
(2∆h)2 , for the defector component the
evaluated expression is given by
6
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lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
N∑
i=0
N−i∑
j=0
[jT
−
j+1P (i, j + 1, t)− jT−i P (i, j, t)]∆t ∝ 2∆h ·
∂
∂p
y(p+ ∆h, q, t)
−2∆h · ∂
∂p
y(p−∆h, q, t)− 2∆h · ∂
∂q
y(p, q + ∆h, t)
+2∆h · ∂
∂q
y(p, q −∆h, t) = (2∆h)2(∂
2y
∂p2
− ∂
2y
∂q2
)
= (2∆h)
2∇2y. (11)
Therefore, introducing the proportional constants σx, σy and scale factor α = 1N , the dynamical discrete equations
turn out to be the continuous equations having the following forms:
∂x
∂t
= a3(
x
x+ y
)3 + a2(
x
x+ y
)2 + a1(
x
x+ y
) + σx∇2x, (12)
∂y
∂t
= b3(
y
x+ y
)3 + b2(
y
x+ y
)2 + b1(
y
x+ y
) + σy∇2y, (13)
where a3 = (piCC−piCDΓmax )(
σ2+z2−z
z )α, a2 = (
σ2+z2−z
z )(
piCD
Γmax
− 1)α + (piCC−piCDΓmax )α, a1 = (
piCD
Γmax
− 1)α, b3 =
(
piDD−piDC
Γmax
)(σ
2+z2−z
z )α, b2 = (
σ2+z2−z
z )(
piDC
Γmax
− 1)α + (piDD−piDCΓmax )α, b1 = (
piDC
Γmax
− 1)α, αt = t′; and nabla-bar-square mea-
sures the net effect of random drift in respect of the probability space, Ω. As we consider the evolutionary dynamics
on network in a finite population, the upper limit of concentration is to be confined by the explicit involvement of total
allocable space N in both of above equations; in the change of time scale this involvement totally depends on the
specific values of other equation parameters and the trick enables us to measure the whole scenario of evolution in the
same scale-up calibration under the constrains of x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0 and x + y ≤ 1, and in the consideration of a periodic
boundary condition in (p, q)-space. The Fig. 2 shows the three panel analytical outcome.
Figure 2: Upper panels: The final concentration distributions of cooperators and defectors over Ω field of 10, 000
observation points; Lower panel: The analytical version outcomes up to 20, 000 time steps at the point (p, q) =
(0.5, 0.4). The data corresponding to the base matrix of Fig. 4 are used.
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2.2 The algorithm version of the evolutionary dynamics
Definitely, the first part of the update process, birth-death, is a slow process than the random drift. Without loss of
generality, we assume that its completion time takes 15 time steps. In a neighbourhood area, in the presence of i-
number of C individuals and j-number of D individuals, the focal C individual gives birth an offspring by Moran rule
of: random() < i·piCC+j·piCDz·Γmax , where the death of the focal individual occurs by the Moran rule of: random() <
i
z ;
and similar to a focal D individual. Regarding each of the complement probabilities, an individual will not participate
in evolution process and the system will remain unaltered. The derived algorithm version is a proper map of the
continuous evolution version undoubtedly. Under the synchronous consideration, the newborn offspring is placed in
empty vertex and if it is not possible, then the offspring takes any randomly chosen place of the neighbourhood. We
obtain a scaling in O(z). Every individual goes through the evolution process at most once in each generation which
has been defined by the 15 time steps. The time complexity of the whole birth-death computation is of the order
O(N ).
On the continuous probability space, in the limit of ∆h→ 0, the increasing rate of an event of certainty about random
drift with positive sign and the decreasing rate of an event of certainty about random drift with negative sign interpret
the randomness at the point (p, q), in the sense that the measurement assumes either positive value, negative value or
zero. In the discrete algorithm case, at the point (p, q) mathematically the randomness of net effectiveness of drift on an
individual where the possibility of drifted individual type is selected by the majority ratio of the individual type in the
neighbourhood area including the focal individual itself is determined separately; an individual attachment rule is of:
random()<p·σ∗, an individual leaving rule is of: random()<q·σ∗, and in the case of complementary probability the
rules are unaffected in which the generated random number is outside of the range. The outside influence possibility
on the evolution is measured by the random drift along with the local possibility of the birth-death. The both the
inequalities are considered simultaneously at a particular point where the random drift constant σ∗ controls the speed
of the drift. Under the synchronous consideration, a newcomer individual is placed at a vacant vertex and if it is not
Figure 3: One of the algorithm version outcomes for N = 100 up to 20, 000 time steps. Without random drift, the
base matrix concerning experimental outcome of the Fig. 4 is depicted here.
8
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possible then the newcomer replaces the focal individual. We obtain a scaling in O(z). Every vertex site go through
the random drift process at most once in each time step. Undoubtedly, here also, the both measurement methods –
continuous and discrete – is two sides of the same coin. The time complexity of the random drift computation is of the
order O(N ).
We use Python library, NetworkX [23], for studying the algorithmic dynamics on networks [24]. The Fig. 3 shows the
two panel algorithm outcome.
3 The significance of parameters
In order to define the term 00 to be equal to 0 we introduce a bound K such that 0 ≤ x + y < K and for such
introduction we have xx+y =
x
K (1 +
x+y−K
K )
−1 ≈ xK2 (2K − x− y), and similarly for yx+y .
The temporal dynamics possesses the trivial equilibrium (0, 0) and one axial equilibrium at the position (x˜, 0) for
a1+a2+a3 = 0 when Γmax = b−c; however, the (0, y˜) is not an equilibrium point since at this position b1+b2+b3 =
−(σ2+z2−zz + 1).
In the linearised temporal dynamics the associated Jacobian matrix at the trivial equilibrium is of the form: M(0,0) =(
2a1
K 0
0 2b1K
)
. If both eigenvalues are negative, the trivial equilibrium is stable here. Introducing, X =
(
x
y
)
,
σ =
(
σx
σy
)
and considering ∇2X = −λX with λ > 0, at the trivial equilibrium the characteristic matrix of
the drift-augmented Jacobian matrix in term of the temporal eigenvalue κ, is of the form: κI − M(0,0) + λσ =(
κ− 2a1K + λσx 0
0 κ− 2b1K + λσy
)
. That is the characteristic equation is given by: κ2 + d1(λ)κ + d2(λ) = 0,
where d1(λ) = (σx + σy)λ − ( 2a1K + 2b1K ) and d2(λ) = λ2 − ( 2a1σxK + 2b1σyK )λ + 4a1b1σxσyK2 . As both, d1 and d2, is
positive, the occurrence of Turing instability [25, 26] is not possible. However, numerical outcomes clearly make
aware of us that on the (p, q)-space the most of the points shows the unstable dynamic character. Therefore, our
assumption about the negative value of spatial eigenvalue, −λ, for each point is not correct – because we do not know
the distribution nature of the spatial eigenvalues on the probability space – where the cooperator will act as activator
under the consideration of 2a1K < σx while the defector will act as inhibitor under the consideration of | 2b1K | > σy .
Here, the positive spatial eigenvalue indicates that the individuals enter into the considering area.
In the linearised temporal dynamics the associated Jacobian matrix at the axial equilibrium is of the form: M(x˜,0) =(
0 − 1x˜ (2a3 + a2)
0 b1x˜
)
. As one of the eigenvalues is zero and the other is negative, thus the axial equilibrium is
non-hyperbolic where the Hartman-Grobman Theorem is not applicable.
It is naturally expected that before both types of individuals go extinct or in their internal position they can form a
non-hyperbolic equilibrium state which defines the non-trivial equilibrium, but to find out an internal equilibrium in
the system is not possible in general by the differential equation rule as conservation principle is not directly used
here; however we can obtain internal equilibrium by imposing a constrain through the stepwise procedure. If K ≈ 0,
then we can determine a non-hyperbolic equilibrium point (x˜, y˜) such that x˜ + y˜ = 2K, where the activation role
and inhabitation role is settled by the pair ( a1y˜4K2 ,
b1x˜
4K2 ) on the centre manifold. We know that the dynamics around
non-hyperbolic points is not robust. Adding non-linearities terms and/or changing parameters may lead to strong
unpredictability.
4 Method outline and outcome
Unlike the previous studies [27, 28, 29], the two distinct evolutionary mechanisms have been described on the random
regular graph of degree z. In each of the initial stages at the attempt of equal distribution, it is tried to randomly assign
the cooperators, defectors and vacant places over the vertices of the graph so that none of the types get an additional
advantage in their evolutionary process. The synchronous model update combines the two steps: one is the birth-death
update where the pair do not fully depend on each other, and second one is the random drift step where the preferential
type chooses on the concept: the like-minded individuals would always attract to each other and the act is operated
by the majority selection rule. Without loss of generality, we take 15 time steps as one generation in which either the
birth or the death occurs at most once. However, according to normal law the birth-death step gets more preference
9
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Figure 4: Left panel: The qualitative comparison between the evolutionary outcomes of the analytical procedure
and the algorithm method; Right panel: The percentage measurement based on the 10, 000 observations related to
evolutionary outcome at each grid site of the analytical procedure. The outcomes after 20, 000 time steps with a
generation interval of 0.02 time scale are examined in consideration of maximum fitness, 0.77, and of fitness payoffs:
piCC = 1.5, piCD = −0.3, piDC = 1.8, piDD = 0. The number of allocable vertices and the degree of the graph
respectively are 1000 and 50 where the random drift coefficient in the analytical procedure and the algorithm method
respectively is 10−5 and 0.3× 10−1.
than the random drift evolutionary step. The algorithm experiment data are collected by averaging over the outcome
values for running the program up to 20, 000 time steps in the 25 different graph structure realisations.
We select the same initial averaging concentration value in the analytical procedure at the particular point of evolu-
tionary observation, in the Fig. 2 the point is (0.5, 0.4) where initial concentrations of other observation points assign
by the uniform distribution law, applied in the range (0, 0.3). The analytical procedure acts as a correcter tool and
run it several times to correct our algorithmic prediction. Both the periodical condition and the bounded condition:
x + y ≤ 1, take into the consideration on the physical space of 100× 100 locations; each location as a point linearly
maps to Ω space.
The outcomes of both evolutionary mechanisms related to the analytics and the algorithm, ensure the ubiquitous
character of cooperation in the presence of the random drift. The (p, q) data-range represents the comparison outcomes
(the Left panel of Fig. 4). The both independent quantities p and q have been considered as random variables in respect
of time scale, while in another turn where time scale is insignificant those act as non random parameter variables. For
different aspects, an arbitrary variable can have such dual character simultaneously. In the model development, we use
this intuitive sense.
In the Right panel of Fig. 4 the five dependent observables in the scale of 0 (or extinction) to 1 (or maximum – the state
of all C or all D) are introduced. The observables are self-explanatory and have been counted on 10000 observation
points. The experiment is carried out over three game classes, namely, Dominance game, Coexistence game and
Coordination game with either N = 100 or N = 1000, where we uniformly set initial conditions so that either of
types do not get an initial advantage in every possible position, but the uniform distribution of the random initial
conditions has its own limitation [30]. According to expectation in mixed population where defectors have higher
fitness than cooperators natural selection favors defectors. However, in the absence of random drift we even observe
the phenomenon of the defector extinction. This observation has a simple interpretation. In the intratype competition
defector fitness payoff is either zero or very minimum, and as a consequence, in the presence of a low number of
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cooperators survival capacity of defectors markedly reduces and ultimately they become extinct in the most of the
possible situations.
5 Conclusion
The visualised experimental data along with data in the Supplementary material, measure the efficiency of the random
drift at sustaining cooperation. In fact, the unbiased attachment rule lays down the equal probable situation for attach-
ment of two types. However, attachment of relatively more defectors than the cooperators leads to extinction, while
the attachment of cooperators increases the survival capacity of individuals, irrespective of their behaviour. As extinc-
tion environment does not have any effect on the plausible survey result of individual promoting, the evolution track
always revealed the fact of cooperation emerging and enhance in front of our eyes. This is why cooperative behaviour
is very natural to observe in various forms of our life system. The explanation does not violate our belief that under
the neutral role play, natural environment always tries to retain the environment of coexistence traits [31, 32, 33] – the
state of biodiversity.
Of particular note is under the ranges of the model parameters the value of b1 + b2 + b3 which is never equal to
zero; consequently, we can not consider the point (0, y˜) as an equilibrium point and it provides us the reason for the
arising question about the chance of survival of defectors without cooperator while a1 + a2 + a3 equal to zero can
be evaluated, means that (x˜, 0) can be an equilibrium point in the evolutionary process. Also one of the explanations
of pattern formation through Turing instability [34] is completely ruled out in this mathematical formalism since the
priori assumption ∇2( xy ) = −λ( xy ) with spatial eigenvalue, λ, greater than zero is not acceptable for every point on
Ω field. Even though if we accept this in some compromise sense probability to occur pattern formation will be almost
zero.
Here, in the many circumstances, as fitnesses of individuals depend on the frequencies of cooperators and defectors,
the Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection which states that average fitness is increased or remains the same
under constant selection does not hold. Concerning the same topic it is worth mentioning that the Hardy-Weinberg
law [35] approved by this mathematical formalism is to be interpreted by, x˙ = y˙ = 0, at the set payoff values equal to
a constant value.
A comparison has been made between the algorithm method and the analytical procedure due to the intention to
demonstrate the natural cooperation characterised by a principle rather than a specific rule of an environmental sce-
nario. For conducting the experiments we consider all possible interrelations among fitness values of two different
types of individuals where one can realise that algorithm version is good for a better prediction to point out the initial
direction and to find out the final outcome of evolutionary fate while the analytical procedure being good tracer of
the intermediate evolutionary path. The evolutionary path which governs by many of the unpredictable characters of
nature to be explained by preassigned strict rules (or randomly ever-changing set of interactors) over a long time is
some extend unrealistic while the analytic one entailed by the average sense can produce closed realistic evolutionary
results. Because of this intuitive belief, we use the algorithm version as a predictor tracer and the analytical version as
a corrector tracer of an evolutionary path. We anticipate our purely mathematical treatment to be a better choice than
the agent-based method [36] to simulate the complexity of heterogeneous populations. The simple design structure,
in particular the nabla-bar-square will have great potential for examining a topological dynamical system in the higher
dimension, and to gain the knowledge we have to walk the extra mile.
In this article we show that the evolution about genetic variation, combining the effects of the social evolution of
the birth-death on network structure and of the random drift, gives the final verdict on the selection of the individual
type. The social evolution, defined also by average birth-death effect in term of the pure replicator equation, depends
only on constant fitness values of individuals and reasonably its outcomes are nothing but the normal display of the
linear impact of the payoff-to-fitness mapping and consequently it might be failing to attain a generality. The one of
the factors considering for cooperation enhancement is the effect of a social network structure. However, it would
be expected for unbiased distribution of individuals, both types of individual would get equal benefit from the social
structure effect. Therefore, one simple conclusion is that over a long evolutionary process the feature of the intratype
interaction acts the key role in cooperation enhancement and defection hindrance where the driving force of lending a
helping hand of themselves provides the instrumental clues to their future evolutionary fate.
6 Supplementary material
Additional materials as a separate file under the heading of Supplementary Material accompanies the paper in Latex
Source Files.
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7 Research data
The main model code is available in GitHub with identifier https://github.com/bijan0317/cdevolution.git
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